[FED Watch] 국채수익률 중단기 소폭 상승, 장기소폭 하락 - 2019.11.25 > Fed Watch

<1> 금주 T-Bill 수익률과 Yield Curve :  장기물 중심 소폭 하락

 

■ 국채 3, 6월물만 소폭 상승한 반면 나머지는 불변 혹은 1bp-7bp 내외하락.

 

  - 1년 물과 3년 물은 불변

  - 5년 및 그 이상 만기 국채 수익률은 1bp-7bp 소폭 하락

  - 지난 주에 이어 장기물 국채 수익률 과도한 하락에 따른 소폭 조정 

■ 11월 12일 이후의 급락세가 지난 주중 이어지다가 주말 소폭 반등. 

    

  - 지난 2주 간의 하락조정이 마무리 되며  10월 중순 수준으로 회복됨. 

<2> 연방준비제도 이사회 회의록(일부)

  <Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, 10월 29–30, 2019>

 

■ Review of Options for Repo Operations to Support Control of the Federal Funds Rate

 

   The staff briefed participants on the recent experience with using repo operations to support control of the federal funds rate and on possibly maintaining a role for repo operations in the monetary policy implementation framework over the longer run. Ongoing capacity for repo operations could be viewed as useful in an ample reserves regime as a way of providing insurance against unexpected stresses in money markets that could drive the federal funds rate outside the Committee’s target range over a sustained period. 

  

   The staff presented two potential approaches for conducting repo operations if the Committee decided to maintain an ongoing role for such operations. Under the first approach, the Desk would conduct modestly sized, relatively frequent repo operations designed to provide a high degree of readiness should the need for larger operations arise; 

   under the second approach, the FOMC would establish a standing fixed-rate facility that could serve as an automatic money market stabilizer. Assessing these two approaches involved several considerations, including the degree of assurance of control over the federal funds rate, the likelihood that participation in the Federal Reserve’s repo operations could become stigmatized, the possibility that the operations could encourage the Federal Reserve’s counterparties to take on excessive liquidity risks in their portfolios, and the potential disintermediation of financial transactions currently undertaken by private counterparties. 

 

   Regular, modestly sized repo operations likely would pose relatively little risk of stigma or moral hazard, but they may provide less assurance of control over the federal funds rate because it might be difficult for the Federal Reserve to anticipate money market pressures and scale up its repo operations accordingly. A standing fixed-rate repo facility would likely provide substantial assurance of control over the federal funds rate, but use of the facility could become stigmatized, particularly if the rate was set at a relatively high level. 

   Conversely, a standing facility with a rate set at a relatively low level could result in larger and more frequent repo operations than would be appropriate. 

 

   And by effectively standing ready to provide a form of liquidity on an as-needed basis, such a facility could increase the risk that some institutions may take on an undesirably high amount of liquidity risk. In their comments following the staff presentation, participants emphasized the importance of maintaining reserves at a level consistent with the Committee’s choice of an ample-reserves monetary policy implementation framework, in which control over the level of the federal funds rate is exercised primarily through the setting of the Federal Reserve’s administered rates and in which active management of the supply of reserves is not required. Some participants indicated that, in such an environment, they would have some tolerance for allowing the federal funds rate to vary from day to day and to move occasionally outside its target range, especially in those instances associated     with easily identifiable technical events; a couple of participants expressed discomfort with such misses. 

   Participants expressed a range of views on the relative merits of the two approaches described by the staff for conducting repo operations. Many participants noted that, once an ample supply of reserves is firmly established, there might be little need for a standing repo facility or for frequent repo operations. 

   Some of these participants indicated that a basic principle in implementing an ample-reserves framework is to maintain reserves on an ongoing basis at levels that would obviate the need for open market operations to address pressures in funding markets in all but exceptional circumstances. 

 

   Many participants remarked, however, that even in an environment with ample reserves, a standing facility could serve as a useful backstop to support control of the federal funds rate in the event of outsized shocks to the system. Several of these participants also suggested that, if a standing facility were created that allowed banks to monetize a portion of their securities holdings at times of market stress, banks could possibly reduce their demand for reserves in normal times, which could make it feasible for the monetary policy implementation framework to operate with a significantly smaller quantity of reserves than would otherwise be needed. A couple of participants pointed out that establishing a standing facility would be similar to the practice of some other major central banks. 

 

   A number of participants noted that, before deciding whether to implement a standing repo facility, additional work would be necessary to assess the likely implications of different design choices for a standing repo facility, such as pricing, eligible counterparties, and the set of acceptable collateral.

   Echoing issues raised at the Committee’s June 2019 meeting, various participants commented on the need to carefully evaluate these design choices to guard against the potential for moral hazard, stigma, disintermediation risk, or excessive volatility in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. A couple of other participants suggested that an approach based on modestly sized, frequent repo operations that could be quickly and substantially ramped up in response to emerging market pressures would mitigate the moral hazard, disintermediation, and stigmatization risks associated with a standing repo facility.

 

   Participants made no decisions at this meeting on the longer-run role of repo operations in the ample-reserves regime or on an approach for conducting repo operations over the longer run. They generally agreed that they should continue to monitor the market effects of the Federal Reserve’s ongoing repo operations and Treasury bill purchases and that additional analysis of the recent period of money market dislocations or of fluctuations in the Federal Reserve’s non-reserve liabilities was warranted. Some participants called for further research on the role that the financial regulatory environment or other factors may have played in the recent dislocations. 

 

■ Committee Policy Action

 

   In their discussion of monetary policy for this meeting, members noted that information received since the September meeting indicated that the labor market remained strong and that economic activity had been rising at a moderate rate. 

   Job gains had been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate had remained low. 

   Household spending had been rising at a strong pace. 

   However, business fixed investment and exports remained weak, as softness in global growth and international trade developments continued to weigh on those sectors. 

   On a 12-month basis, both the overall inflation rate and inflation for items other than food and energy were running below 2 percent. 

   Market-based measures of inflation compensation remained low. 

   Survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations were little changed.

 

   In light of the implications of global developments for the economic outlook as well as muted inflation pressures, most members agreed to lower the target range for the federal funds rate to 1½ to 1¾ percent at this meeting. 

   

   The members who supported this action viewed it as consistent with helping offset the effects on aggregate demand of weak global growth and trade developments, insuring against downside risks arising from those sources, and promoting a more rapid return of inflation to the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective. 

 

   Two members preferred to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate at this meeting. These members indicated that the economic outlook remained positive and that they anticipated, under an unchanged policy stance, continued strong labor market conditions and solid growth in activity, with inflation gradually moving up to the Committee’s 2 percent objective. 

 

    Members agreed that, in determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee would assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. They also agreed that those assessments would take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. With regard to the postmeeting statement, members agreed to update the language of the Committee’s description of incoming data to acknowledge that investment spending and U.S. exports had remained weak. 

    

    In describing the monetary policy outlook, they also agreed to remove the “act as appropriate” language and emphasize that the Committee would continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook as it assessed the appropriate path of the target range for the federal funds rate. This change was seen as consistent with the view that the current stance of monetary policy was likely to remain appropriate as long as the economy performed broadly in line with the Committee’s expectations and that policy was not on a preset course and could change if developments emerged that led to a material reassessment of the economic outlook. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the SOMA in accordance with the following domestic policy directive, to be released at 2:00 p.m.:

 

 

    “Effective October 31, 2019, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 1½ to 1¾ percent. In light of recent and expected increases in the Federal Reserve’s nonreserve liabilities, the Committee directs the Desk to purchase Treasury bills at least into the second quarter of next year to maintain over time ample reserve balances at or above the level that prevailed in early September 2019.

 

     The Committee also directs the Desk to conduct term and overnight repurchase agreement operations at least through January of next year to ensure that the supply of reserves remains ample even during periods of sharp increases in non-reserve liabilities, and to mitigate the risk of money market pressures that could adversely affect policy implementation. In addition, the Committee directs the Desk to conduct overnight reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more than one day when necessary to accommodate weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 1.45 percent, in amounts limited only by the value of Treasury securities held outright in the System Open Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of $30 billion per day. 

     The Committee directs the Desk to continue rolling over at auction all principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities and to continue reinvesting all principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and agency mortgagebacked securities received during each calendar month. Principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities up to $20 billion per month will continue to be reinvested in Treasury securities to roughly match the maturity composition of Treasury securities outstanding; principal payments in excess of $20 billion per month will continue to be reinvested in agency mortgage-backed securities. Small deviations from these amounts for operational reasons are acceptable. 

     The Committee also directs the Desk to engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve’s agency mortgage-backed securities transactions.”

 

   The vote also encompassed approval of the statement below to be released at 2:00 p.m.: 

 

    “Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in September indicates that the labor market remains strong and that economic activity has been rising at a moderate rate. Job gains have been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Although household spending has been rising at a strong pace, business fixed investment and exports remain weak. On a 12-month basis, overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; surveybased measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.

 

    Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. In light of the implications of global developments for the economic outlook as well as muted inflation pressures, the Committee decided to lower the target range for the federal funds rate to 1½ to 1¾ percent. This action supports the Committee’s view that sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective are the most likely outcomes, but uncertainties about this outlook remain. The Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook as it assesses the appropriate path of the target range for the federal funds rate. In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and      international developments.”

 

■ 찬성(8인):  Jerome H. Powell, John C.Williams, Michelle W. Bowman, 

         Lael Brainard, James Bullard, Richard H. Clarida, Charles L. Evans, and

         Randal K. Quarles.

   반대(2인) Esther L. George and Eric Rosengren.

 

 

<3> 연방준비제도의 자문기구 (#2) : 「지역예금기관자문위원회」

    CDIAC(Community Depository Institution Advisory Council)」

 

■ 연방준비제도는 책임있는 정책을 수행하기 위해 

   다섯 개의 자문기구를 설치하여 연방준비제도이사회에 대해 자문하고 있다.  

 

  ① The Community Advisory Council, 

  ② The Community Depository Institutions Advisory Council, 

  ③ The Federal Advisory Council, 

  ④ The Insurance Policy Advisory Committee, and 

  ⑤ The Model Validation Council. 

 

■ 이 중 

   ③ The Federal Advisory Council과 

   ④ The Insurance Policy Advisory Committee는 관련법에 의해 설립되었으며 

      나머지는 연준 내부규정에 의해 설치되었다.   

 

■ 지역예금기관자문위원회 CDIAC

   (Community Depository Institutions Advisory Council)

 

  - CDIAC는 경제상황, 자금시장 상황, 기타 여러 사안에 대한 정보를 얻기위해

    연준이사회가 2010년 설치하였음.

 

    연준자문위원회(Federal Advisory Council)과는 달리 법적인 기구는 아니나

    경제상황, 자금시장 상황 및 기타 사안에 대한 일차적인 정보를 수집하는 

    점에 있어서는 FAC와 동일한 기능을 수행하고 있음.

 

    회원은 지역 연방준비은행의 자문기관에 속한 지역은행, 저축기관, 신협의          대표자로 구성되어 있으며 12 연방은행에서 각각 한 명씩 대표가 선출됨. 

    회의는 일 년에 두 번 DC에서 개최됨.   

 

    The Community Depository Institutions Advisory Council (CDIAC) was established in 2010 by the Board of Governors to provide input to the Board on the economy, lending conditions, and other issues of interest to community depository institutions. Unlike the Federal Advisory Council, CDIAC is not a statutory body, but it performs a parallel function in providing first-hand input to the Board on the economy, lending conditions, and other issues. Members are selected from representatives of banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions serving on newly created local advisory councils at the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. One member of each of the Reserve Bank councils is selected to serve on the CDIAC, which will meet twice a year with the Board in Washington.

 

<2019 CDIAC회원 및 대표지역>

 

   Christopher D. Maher, Toms River, New Jersey, President

   Joe Quiroga, Edinburg, Texas, Vice President

   Alvin J. Cowans, Orlando, Florida

   Robert A. DeAlmeida, Towson, Maryland

   Douglas S. Gordon, Wauwatosa, Wisconsin

   Brad Koehn, Lincoln, Nebraska

   Shari Laven, Alexandria, Minnesota

   Tyrone E. Muse, Endicott, New York

   T. Michael Price, Indiana, Pennsylvania

   Richard M. Sanborn, San Diego, California

   Dorothy A. Savarese, Orleans, Massachusetts

   Ann Wells, Louisville, Kentucky

[부록.1] 지난 주 T-Bill 수익률 동향 

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